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This book is the outcome of the Brandt Commissionof
over eighteen months' work by a distinguished secretariat
and ten meetings of the Commission. The Commission -
whose work was in part inspired by Robert
McNamarawas chaired by Willy Brandt and consisted
of eighteen members from all over the world, all of
whom play an active and prominent part in the political
lives of their own countries. The result is a shortish
book less than 300 pages) which covers all the main
'world issuesfrom population to arms, agriculture
to the environment, employnient to participation.
The book is coherent, well argued and well presented.
Moreoverand this is perhaps surprising in view of
the fact that the document is a consensus one, to
which all members (coming from very diferent
backgrounds, politically and geographically, ranging
from Edward Heath and Katharine Graham to Shridath
Ramphal, Amir Jamal and Layachi Yaker) have
subscribedit contains some important and substantive
conclusions.
The Brandt Commission is itself an aspect of North-
South relations: the Report is thus part of the scene it
is surveying. lt should, therefore, be judged on rather
different criteria from academic treatises on the same
subject: the question at issue is not whether it makes
an original contribution, hut rather whether its
conclusions are valid, and if So whether they are likely
to have a substantive effect on world relationships.
The Brandt Commission is a successor to the Pearson
Commission of the early 1960s: that Commission
made a number of unexceptionable recommendations,
which the world ignored. Its Report recommended an
increase in aid to 0.7 per cent of GNP; almost
immediately aid fell as a proportion of GNP. No-one
would claim reverse cause and effect. But one can
claim with justice that, from the point of view of world
economic development, things would not have been
any different if the Pearson Commission had never
happened. At the time it could be argued that a report
on world development by prominent people might
make an important contribution to world developments.
But the Pearson Commission tried and failed. Hence
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this can no longer be argued; thus the Brandt Commission
has to do more than Pearson if it is to justify its
existence. This is especially true in view of the cataclysmic
nature of world developments today.
Will the world he substantially different because of
the Brandt Commission?
Taking the chapters, topic by topic, it is difficult to
believe that much will change. On most topics, both
the arguments put forward and the conclusions/re-
commendations that follow will be familiar to most
people who have worked in these areas. For example,
on population the Commission emphasises the need
for population control; on arms, the need for arms
control; on trade, the need for trade liberalisation; on
international investment the need for 'Codes of Conduct';
on agriculture the need to increase production; on
energy the need to develop new energy sources, and
so on. On most topics the Report is up to date with
recent liberal conventional wisdom and presents a
quite sophisticated analysis: for example, in the discussion
of population, it recognises the need for social and
economic changes as well as conventional population
programmes; on agriculture, it mentions land reform
as well as irrigation, fertiliser and seeds.
The most important conclusions concern three related
issuesthe international monetary system, the transfer
of resources from North to South, and the nature of
aid. The Report argues for a massive increase in
resource transfers, with the aim of first reaching and
then substantially surpassing the 0.7 per cent target.
This target is adopted despite the belief that 'The issue
today is not only, or even mainly, one of aid: rather of
basic changes in the world economy to help developing
countries pay their own way'. The Report introduces
the concept of automaticitv as a means of reaching
such targets, by having levies on some item (eg trade)
which automatically increase with inflation and growth.
It seems likely that automaticity will come to form a
central issue in North-South debates. The Report sees
the central importance of international monetary reform;
while it makes no startling recommendations, it takes
a liberal stance, which is welcome from any source in
these days of monetarism. It also provides a well
argued critique of IMF operations and makes some
suggestions for change which would constitute a major
improvement in the international system of adjustment.
On the form of aid, the Report emphasises the need
for medium-term programme aid to supplement the
project-oriented activities of the World Bank and
others, and the short-term non-development finance
available from the Fund, and argues for a new institution
to administer this aid, a 'World Development Fund'.
The Report might have been a substantially more
powerful document if it had concentrated exclusively
on these three subjects, permitting more in-depth
analysis and more space for persuasive documentation.
As it is,so many topics are dealt with so summarily and
so many recommendations flow smoothly yet shrilly
from the page. that there is some danger that none will
be taken seriously. Yet on these three issues the
Report does have some serious contribution to make,
and one that does not simply repeat what is being said
daily in more specialised fora. On the remainder of the
issues. which form much the largest part of the Report,
what is said is. for the most part. unexceptionable but
too much is said, too urbanely. in too short a space
about too huge topics. for any serious impact. Given
the present economic conjuncture, the question of the
level of world demand is probably the most critical
determinant of prospects for development, both directly
and through indirect effects on levels of protectionism
and aid. This is recognised in the section on the
international monetary system; but it could (and in my
view should, given the nature of the Commission)
have formed the central topic. with questions of
demand and employment in developed countries being
a central theme. So long as the determinants of world
demand remain as unco-ordinated and subject to
random shocks as they are, deflationary shocks to the
world system are likely to dwarf other measures of the
sort proposed here.
Some of the institutional recommendationsparticularly
those concerning international institutionsmay well
result in institutional change. Indeed, the World Bank's
'structural assistance' programme is largely an (implicit)
response to the Brandt Commission's demand for
programme aid and its claim that a new international
institution is required. Another important suggestion
is that the World Bank should increase its gearing
ratio (from 1:1 to 1:2. thus doubling its potential
resource transfer). This too is likely to be taken up by
the Bank if its constitution and Directors permit.
Whether or not the IMF will be SO amenable to
suggestions is another matter, but it seems likely that
some of the Brandt Conimissions suggestions on
conditionality and development will be taken seriously
on the other side of 19th Street. if only to avoid
displacement by new institutions. But these reforms.
while important. do not go to the heart of the matter,
either in relation to Survival' or to the main elements
in the Brandt Commission package. Forthis the whole
package is required. including notably the massive
resource transfer as well as the particular recommen-
dations in other areas.
But in all areas other than international institutionsthat
is all areas where national and particular interests are
of significancescepticism sets in. Why should the
recommendations of this Commissionwhich are
substantially little different from many others proposed
in many places, including many of the Group of 77
NIEO proposals, which have been repeatedly
rejected - have any more effect than previous reports
and resolutions? If this were a group of current and
future Prime Ministers, instead of ex- and manqué
ones, then the very fact that this group agreed on this
set of proposals would be of significance. But if they
had been in power they would have been subject to
pressures that would probably have prevented agreement
on anything like the present document. Take the
question of trade, for example: to be against
protectionism if one is an economist or a politician out
of power is one thing; to be against it in practice when
one is in power, faced by mounting unemployment,
threatened lost elections, critical balance of payments
losses and drains on international reserves, is another.
Similarly for arms control; this is an issue rightly
beloved of all social observers. But how many politicians
have been able to withstand the commercial and
political pressures which create a massively strong
nexus of manufacturers, sellers and buyers, which
form the most dynamic element in the world
economy?
The Report has an answer to these questionsan
answer which forms the underlying and cohesive
theme of the whole report. That is the concept of
mutuality of interests. a phrase which recurs at least
once every Chapter. The argument is that there are
mutual interests between North and South in almost
every area discussed: if these interests are fully
recognised, then the reforms described will not only
have intellectual appeal to the powerless: they will
also be politically feasible. The Report finds mutual
interests in population control, in food, in the
environment, in exploitation of mineral resources, in
trade, in energy, in multinationals, even in aid. The
concept of mutual interests is thus an all-embracing
one and a potentially powerful one. If established, it
would be the most challenging and important of all the
Reports conclusions, indeed it fornis the basis for
almost all the others. It is thus worth examining the
concept in more detail.
Proper examination can only take place at the level of
particular areas and particular proposals. But some
general points need to he made. First, if there were
really powerful mutual interests in the relevant areas,
then the reforms under discussion would already have
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taken place. Ignorance might have prevented it, but
this is unlikely, given the familiarity of most of the
recommendations. Apart from ignorance there must
be some obstacles preventing the realisation of these
mutual interests. If we examine any area in any depth,
we see at once that there are obstacles. These obstacles
take a number of forms: one is that there are conflicts
as well as mutual interests; the conflicts are in many
cases more powerful than the mutual interests. Very
often the conflicts are short-term, while the mutual
gains only occur in the long run; the conflicts may be
rather obvious and certain, the gains uncertain and
unclear. For example, if the South improves the terms
on which it acquires technology, in the short term the
North will lose. lt may gain in the long run because of
the more favourable investment climate. But this is
not certain. Another obstacle is that the countries
which are likely to gain from the mutual interests may
not be the same ones as those that are likely to suffer
short-term losses. This is most obviously the case in
trade. It may well be that the North as a whole would
gain from liberal trading arrangements with the South.
because the South always runs a trade deficit with the
North so any additional imports from the South are
always more than offset by additional exports. But it is
not necessarily the same set of countries that gain, as
those that lose. It is likely that successful manufacturing
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exportersJapan, Germany for examplewould gain
from selling extra exports to the South, while the less
successfuleg the US and UKwould he losers from
liberalising imports. But trade arrangements are decided
on a country basis and not by the North as a whole.
Another obstacle to the realisation of mutual interests
arises from the fact that the potential gainers may be
powerless within a particular country, while the losers
form powerful pressure groups: this is obviously the
case in trade (gainers are consumers at large, losers
particular groups of employers and employees) and
also in arms.
Detailed examination of almost all the areas covered
by the Commission suggests that the obstacles to
changeconflicts of interest, opposition of powerful
groups and so onare more powerful and effective
than the mutual interests, which is not surprising given
the manifold failures to negotiate change. The concept
of mutual interests is thus much less powerful than
suggested in the Report. lt isa fruitful background and
approach to negotiation only if the conflicts- and
obstacles are also full analysed. Unless they are, the
mutual-interest philosophy produces recommendations
which tend to be naive and unrealistic and smack of
wishful thinking, and whichpublic relations apartdo
little to further the cause of international survival.
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